{"id":17160,"date":"2022-05-20T16:37:44","date_gmt":"2022-05-20T16:37:44","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/test.nahtnow.com\/?p=17160"},"modified":"2022-05-20T16:37:44","modified_gmt":"2022-05-20T16:37:44","slug":"supreme-court-vs-private-prison-liability","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/test.nahtnow.com\/en\/supreme-court-vs-private-prison-liability\/","title":{"rendered":"Supreme Court VS. Private Prison Liability"},"content":{"rendered":"<h1>Supreme Court Rules on Private Prison Liability Inmates at private and government-run prisons should have same rights<\/h1>\n<div>\n<div><img class=\"CToWUd\" src=\"https:\/\/ci3.googleusercontent.com\/proxy\/IJDGSPmTW_dt4BMsVUqXSUIK2MKrybTYRHMblN8f_FkLHEAUkBlbeWUV5UTCrq0evsPtocykPDsbt_ZameZINhMaMeyTKw7o2pDEzeypFvZhzRhJh2Z7GF-Hxz6QXoN_qvPu4xzT_YY9u2z0JQ=s0-d-e1-ft#https:\/\/reason.org\/wp-content\/themes\/reason-dot-org-theme\/resources\/assets\/img\/favicon.png\" \/><\/div>\n<div>\n<div>Geoffrey Segal<\/div>\n<div><\/div>\n<div>This Law went into effect in 2002, just have to find a loophole. The ability to sue a private prison operator is often touted as a key benefit of privatization that increases prison quality and inmate safety. However, the Supreme Court recently declared that private prison companies who operate federal facilities <em>cannot<\/em> be sued by inmates for constitutional violations. Inmates can still sue the individual officers, but the Court would not extend the protection to include the corporation-a much more lucrative proposition.<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div>\n<p>The Court noted that inmates in state facilities operated by private companies do enjoy the right to sue operators. In order for this right to be extended to federal inmates, the Court called on Congress to act and write new law.<\/p>\n<p>Congress should act. Inmates in federal private facilities should have the same protections and rights as inmates in state private facilities. In addition, Congress should review the current liability laws and eliminate many of the protections federal and state officials enjoy. Doing so will provide the strongest protection of inmate civil rights.<\/p>\n<p>Simply because inmates serve out their sentences in different types of facilities, i.e., public and private, they should not have different protections and rights.<\/p>\n<p>Presented below is a brief summary of relevant judicial actions in an attempt to illuminate the issue and promote a broader understanding of the issues at hand.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Case History<\/strong><\/p>\n<table>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><em>Richardson v. McKnight,<\/em> 521 U.S. 410 (1997)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>In <em>Richardson v.<\/em> <em>McKnight<\/em>, a prison inmate sued two guards at a prison in Tennessee that had been privatized. The plaintiff alleged that the guards had deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution. Hence, the plaintiff alleged, the guards were liable to him under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.<\/p>\n<p>Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the court and noted several distinctions between government and private agents. He noted that government agents typically work within civil service rules that provide them some security and \u201cmay limit the ability to punish individual employees.\u201d However, firms in the marketplace face pressures to encourage sound decisionmaking. Also, firms do not have to contend with civil service restrictions-thus they can use inducements (carrots and sticks) to motivate employees. Thus, immunity would not improve the quality of decisions made by firms and agents.<\/p>\n<p>Justice Scalia wrote the dissent. He argued that immunity should be granted on the basis of function, not public or private status. The dissenters believed that whenever private actors \u201cstand so far in the place of the State and exercise its political authority and do not act in any private capacity,\u201d they should enjoy the same immunity as state actors.<\/p>\n<p>Ultimately, in <em>Richardson<\/em> the Supreme Court held that employees of private firms could not invoke the immunity defense available to state government actors. The Court recognized that the incentive structure differs between government and private providers. They noted that private firms seek to maximize profits-which involves minimizing costs. Without meaningful oversight, the court argued that firms might engage in harmful activity to either increase revenue or lower the costs. Thus, liability rules are necessary to discourage such behavior.<\/p>\n<p>However, government actors do not have these pressures, and are not subject to potential negative externalities. The Court assumes that government actors act in the public\u2019s best interest; thus, to ensure that the public\u2019s interest is properly carried out immunity should be granted.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<p>On November 27th the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hold corporations under contract with the federal government liable for constitutional violations in <em>Correctional Service Corporation v.<\/em> <em>Malesko<\/em> 122 S.Ct. 515 (2001). The case involved a federal inmate and a private contractor with the U.S. Bureau of Prisons (BOP).<\/p>\n<p>Malesko, the inmate was housed on the fifth floor of the Le Marquis Community Correctional Center, a halfway house operated by Correctional Service Corporation (CSC). A CSC policy required inmates that lived below the sixth floor to use the stairs to reach their rooms. Malesko was exempted from this policy because he suffered from a heart condition limiting his ability to climb stairs.<\/p>\n<p>But when a CSC employee forbade respondent to use the elevator, he was forced to use the stairs, had a heart attack, and fell.<\/p>\n<p>The District Court treated the complaint as raising a \u201ccruel and unusual punishment\u201d (Eight Amendment) claim under <em>Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents<\/em>, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), in which the Court recognized \u201can implied private action for damages against federal officers alleged to have violated a citizen\u2019s constitutional rights.\u201d In dismissing the suit the district court, relied on the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in <em>FDIC v.<\/em> <em>Meyer<\/em>, 510 U.S. 471 (1996)-\u201ca <em>Bivens<\/em> action may only be maintained against an individual\u201d and thus cannot be brought against a corporation.<\/p>\n<p>The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed this decision in part citing that while <em>Bivens<\/em> applied to federal agents and not to federal agencies (via <em>Meyer<\/em>), it should be extended to private entities to \u201caccomplish the important <em>Bivens<\/em> goal of providing a remedy for constitutional violations.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><strong>Chief Justice Rehnquist<\/strong> delivered the opinion of the court:<\/p>\n<p>The main issue the court has to determine is whether <em>Bivens<\/em> \u201cshould be extended to allow recovery against a private corporation operating a halfway house under contract with the Bureau of Prisons.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Malesko asks the court to extend the limited holding of <em>Bivens<\/em> to give a right of action against private companies acting under color of federal law. He argues that this extension would further deter the unconstitutional acts of individuals, and give companies an added incentive to prevent the violations.<\/p>\n<p>In both <em>Davis v.<\/em> <em>Passman<\/em>, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), and <em>Carlson v.<\/em> <em>Green<\/em>, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), the court applied the core holding of <em>Bivens<\/em>. In <em>Davis,<\/em> a new right of action was extended because the plaintiff lacked any other remedy-it was \u201cdamages or nothing.\u201d In <em>Carlson,<\/em> the court inferred a right of action against individual prison officials where the plaintiff\u2019s only alternative was a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) claim against the United States. However, the threat of suit against the United States is insufficient to deter unconstitutional acts of individuals-since the <em>Bivens<\/em> remedy is recoverable against individuals, it is more effective than the FTCA remedy. The court also found it \u201ccrystal clear\u201d that Congress intended FTCA and <em>Bivens<\/em> to serve as \u201cparallel\u201d and \u201ccomplementary\u201d sources of liability.<\/p>\n<p>The Court has consistently struck down any attempts to extend <em>Bivens<\/em> post-<em>Carlson<\/em>, noting that in most cases Congress has appropriately provided meaningful redress while proving competence in crafting relief. \u201cCongress is in a far better position than a court to evaluate the impact of a new species of litigation between federal employees.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Most recently, in <em>FDIC v.<\/em> <em>Meyer<\/em>, the Court unanimously declined to extend <em>Bivens<\/em> to permit suits against federal agencies, in this case the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. \u201cThe purpose of <em>Bivens<\/em> is to deter the <em>officer<\/em>,\u201d not the agency. The Court reasoned that given the choice, plaintiffs would sue a federal agency instead of an individual, since individuals generally have a qualified immunity defense under <em>Bivens<\/em>; permitting suits against federal agencies would virtually eliminate suites against individual officers of the kind authorized in <em>Bivens<\/em>; rather than extending <em>Bivens<\/em> protection. Such a move would eviscerate it and replace it with an entirely different cause of action.<\/p>\n<p>The Court concludes that Malesko\u2019s claim is fundamentally different from any other application of <em>Bivens<\/em>.<\/p>\n<p>Again, the purpose of <em>Bivens<\/em> is to deter individual federal officers from committing constitutional violations. In <em>Meyer<\/em>, the court noted that threats against agencies did not carry the same type of deterrence. \u201cIf we were to imply a damages action directly against federal agencies\u2026there would be no reason for aggrieved parties to bring damages actions against individual officers. The deterrent effects of the <em>Bivens<\/em> remedy would be lost.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Malesko claims that his action, even under <em>Meyer<\/em>, advances the core deterrence purpose of <em>Bivens<\/em>. Because \u201ccorporations respond to market pressures and make decisions without regard to constitutional obligations, requiring payment for the constitutional harms they commit is the best way to discourage future harms.\u201d Even if that is true, it has no relevance to <em>Bivens<\/em>, which is concerned solely with deterring the unconstitutional acts of individual officers. \u201cIf deterring the conduct of a policymaking entity was the purpose of <em>Bivens<\/em>, then <em>Meyer<\/em> would have implied a damages remedy against the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.\u201d However, <em>Bivens<\/em> is not based on the premise of checking the policymaking entity or agency but rather deters individual officers who commit unconstitutional acts.<\/p>\n<p>Furthermore, there is no reason to extend <em>Bivens<\/em> to include this remedy. <em>No federal prisoners<\/em> enjoy this remedy-if a prisoner in a BOP facility alleges a constitutional deprivation, his only course of action is against the offending individual officer (subject to the defense of qualified immunity). The prisoner cannot bring a <em>Bivens<\/em> claim against the officers employer-the United States or the BOP. Again, his only remedy lies against the individual. \u201cWhether it makes sense to impose asymmetrical liability costs on private prison facilities alone is a question for Congress, not us, to decide.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Justice Stevens argues that this ruling puts the constitutional rights of tens of thousands of inmates in jeopardy citing several cases of inmate abuse at private facilities and Legal Aid Society of New York\u2019s and the American Civil Liberties Union <em>Amicus<\/em> briefs. In all but one of these cases, the private facility in question housed <em>state<\/em> inmates. These inmates already enjoy a right of action against private correctional providers under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. If Malesko\u2019s claim were true, then the added deterrence provided by Section 1983 right of action would result in fewer claims, where Congress already provides for such liability. \u201cThat the trend appears to be just the opposite is not surprising given the BOP\u2019s oversight and monitoring of its private contract facilities.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>In sum, the respondent seeks an extension of <em>Bivens<\/em>. The Court concludes that the extension will not advance <em>Bivens\u2019<\/em> core purpose of deterring individual officers from violating prisoners\u2019 constitutional rights. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Justices Scalia<\/strong> and <strong>Thomas<\/strong> concurring.<\/p>\n<p>Justices Scalia and Thomas join the opinion of the court because they agree with the narrow interpretation of the rationale and application of <em>Bivens<\/em>. While a broad reading of <em>Bivens<\/em>, such as the dissent\u2019s, may well produce a result in Malesko\u2019s favor, such a broad reading would be unwarranted because <em>Bivens<\/em> itself was wrongly decided. <em>Bivens<\/em> is \u201ca relic of the heady days\u201d of judicial activism in which the Court overzealously created new causes of action; and that case, together with its follow-up cases, should not be used as precedent beyond the precise circumstances of those cases.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg,<\/strong> and <strong>Breyer<\/strong> dissenting.<\/p>\n<p>Stevens suggests that the violation in question was committed by a federal agent-a private corporation employed by the BOP to perform functions that would otherwise be performed by individual employees of the federal government. Thus the real question is whether to create an exception to <em>Bivens<\/em> and <em>Carlson<\/em>, not whether it should extend to cases beyond their \u201ccore premise.\u201d Before <em>Meyer<\/em>, the Courts of Appeals had held that corporate agents performing federal functions, like human agents doing so, were proper defendants in <em>Bivens<\/em> actions. Essentially, they stated that the company is the agent, not the employees of the company.<\/p>\n<p>In <em>Meyer<\/em>, the court drew a distinction between \u201cfederal agents\u201d and \u201can agency of the Federal Government.\u201d The court did not discuss private corporations as agents-nor did the court suggest that these agents (corporate agents) be viewed any differently than human agents-\u201ccorporate agents should not be treated more favorably than human agents.\u201d Thus, the company should be held liable in this case.<\/p>\n<p>The Court claims that an extension of <em>Bivens<\/em> would damage its deterrence value. However, tort liability for corporations does in fact have deterrence value, at least as much as liability for corporate employees. The organizational structure of private prisons \u201cis one subject to the ordinary competitive pressures that normally help private firms adjust their behavior in response to the incentives that tort suits provide-pressures not necessarily present in government departments\u201d [<em>Richardson v.<\/em> <em>McKnight<\/em>, 521 U.S. 399 (1997)-see sidebar]. Thus the private entity here is distinguishable from the federal agency in <em>Meyer<\/em>. In fact, the ruling today sends a message to managers of private prisons to adopt cost saving policies that jeopardize the constitutional rights of tens of thousands of inmates.<\/p>\n<p>Stevens argues that by permitting liability in this case, it would not give a prisoner in a private facility more rights and options than a counterpart in a public facility-as the majority suggests. He further notes that both inmates \u201cwould be unable to sue the principal (i.e., the Government), but would be able to sue the primary federal agent (i.e., the government official or the corporation).\u201d Again drawing on the basis that the corporation is hired, and administers the contract, they in turn become the \u201cagent.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Stevens further argues that the Court\u2019s ruling in fact creates the very asymmetry it tried to avoid. State prisoners may sue a private prison for deprivation of constitutional rights (see <em>Lugar v.<\/em> <em>Edmondson Oil Co.<\/em> 457 U.S. 922 (1982)-permitting suit against private corporations exercising \u201cstate action\u201d), yet the court \u201cdenies such a remedy to that prisoner\u2019s federal counterpart.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Should the standard be the same for the federal government and the states? Using <em>Bolling v.<\/em> <em>Sharpe<\/em> 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (\u201cin view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government\u201d), Stevens argues that the standard should be.<\/p>\n<p>In concluding, Stevens argues that Congress has already acted and effectively ratified the <em>Bivens<\/em> remedy. \u201cSecond, a rule that has been such a well-recognized part of our law for over 30 years should be accorded full respect by the Members of this Court, whether or not they would have endorsed that rule when it was first announced. For our primary duty is to apply and enforce settled law, not to revise that law to accord with our own notions of sound policy.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><em>Geoffrey Segal is director of privatization and government reform at Reason Foundation<\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Supreme Court Rules on Private Prison Liability Inmates at private and government-run prisons should have same rights Geoffrey Segal This Law went into effect in 2002, just have to find a loophole. The ability to sue a private prison operator is often touted as a key benefit of privatization that increases prison quality and inmate<a class=\"read-more-link\" href=\"https:\/\/test.nahtnow.com\/en\/supreme-court-vs-private-prison-liability\/\"> Read More&#8230;<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":17163,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"categories":[3,40,5,6,1],"tags":[1459,87],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/test.nahtnow.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17160"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/test.nahtnow.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/test.nahtnow.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/test.nahtnow.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/test.nahtnow.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=17160"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/test.nahtnow.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17160\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":17162,"href":"https:\/\/test.nahtnow.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17160\/revisions\/17162"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/test.nahtnow.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/17163"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/test.nahtnow.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=17160"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/test.nahtnow.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=17160"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/test.nahtnow.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=17160"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}